Recent Supreme Court Decisions

2012

  1. Yandal Inv. Pty Ltd and Tahlia Family Trust v. White Rivers Gold LTd and Mason, SCT Civil 11-03 (01/25/12): Order Granting in Part and Denying in part Motion to Dismiss Appeal.  The Supreme Court concluded that, unless the High Court directs entry of judgment pursuant to MIRCP, Rule 54(b), the orders appealed from (with exception of the High Court’s May 19, 2011 “stay order”) are not “final decisions,” and the Supreme Court lack jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from those orders at this time.  The Supreme Court also concluded that the High Court’s May 19, 2011 “stay order” is immediately appealable as an exception to the “final judgment” rule under Moses H. Cone or , alternatively, is an appealable “collateral order” over which the court can assert jurisdiction.  Finally, the Court concluded it did not have pendent appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory orders appealed from.

2015

  1. Niedenthal v CEO, SCT Civil 15-01 (01/08/15): Order Denying “Motion for Stay” pending appeal.  Appellant, CEO, has not demonstrated it will suffer irreparable harm. Additionally, the Court finds that any harm to Appellant does not outweigh the harm to Appellee, Niedenthal, that the public interest favors neither party, and that Appellant has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood or probability of success on the issues raised in its underlying appeal. Therefore, Appellant’s “motion for stay” is DENIED.
  2. CEO v. Simeon, et al., SCT Civil 11-01 (10/12/15): Opinion finding that the Marshall Islands Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) does not apply to the Chief Electoral Officer’s new definition of the “date of election”; therefore the the High Court’s decision is AFFIRMED. Prior to the 2007 general election, the CEO had accepted postal ballots postmarked in the United States on the “date of the election” — a day after the election in the Marshall Islands, given that the United States is on the other side of the dateline. For the 2007 general election, the CEO rejected postal ballots postmarked in the United States on the “date of the election,” having re-defined “date of the election” for postal ballots as the day of election in the Marshall Islands. Appellants did not argue that the CEO’s interpretation was not reasonable, but instead they argued that in adopting the new interpretation, the CEO violated the APA’s requirements (notice-and-comment period, Cabinet approval, and publication of effective rules, all of which the CEO did not do), so their ballots should be counted. The Supreme Court, citing Bien v. MI Chief Electoral Officer, 1 MILR 94 (S. Ct. Civil 90-01), held that where the Elections and Referenda Act sets forth a specific and distinct procedure that the CEO must follow for the decision at issue, the CEO must follow the Elections and Referenda Act, not the APA. As appellants did not argue whether the CEO complied the requirements of the Election and Referenda Act, the Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ limited argument made on appeal that the CEO did not comply of the APA.
  3. In Re: the Citizenship of Sampang, SCT Civil 14-02 (10/27/15): Opinion affirming the High Court’s judgment that Sampang is qualified to register as a citizen of the Marshall Islands: Sampang met the three year residency required by the Constitution; the High Court did not err in refusing to give deference to the late-filed Certificate for/against Citizenship by the Minister of Justice; and Republic waived its argument that the “R-1” visa is required to commence the three-year residency period by not raising the issue at trial.
  4. Zedkaia and Toring v. Marshalls Energy Co., Inc., et al., SCT Civil 12-01 (11/18/15): Opinion affirming the High Court’s summary judgment that the Government, not the traditional owners of Lotola Weto, Utuwe Weto, and Lobotin Weto, Dalap Island, Majuro Atoll, Marshall Islands, owned the land reclaimed by the Government, upon which the Government erected structures include a fuel farm. The High Court held that (1) to the extent the disputed land was created by the Government on submerged areas below the high water mark, the Government owns that land, and (2) to the extent the disputed land was not below the high water mark when the Government entered the land, Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.

2017

  1. Chubb Ins. v Eleni, et al., SCT Civ 16-02 (06/06/17): Opinion on a Removed Questions, holding (i) that the High Court need not defer to the Hong Kong limitation suit and the limitation fund constituted under the “Convention on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976,” and that defendants can avail themselves of the procedures provided by the Marshall Islands Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act , Marshall Islands Revised Code Title 47, Sections 501, et seq., should they choose to limit liability in the High Court proceedings.
  2. Hitto and Emil v Toka and Caleb, SCT Civil 15-03, and Hitto and Emil v Bejang, et al., SCT Civil 15-04 (07/28/17): Opinion affirming High Court decisions.
  3. Samuel v Almen, SCT Civil 17-02 (09/20/17): Order Denying Writ of Mandamus.   The Supreme Court found that the evil to be avoided by requiring the disqualification of judges for previously having “played a role in the case” (Article VI, Section 1(6) of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act 1983, as amended, 27 MIRC, Chapter 2, Section 267) is to prevent conflicts of interest and bias which might influence impartial decision making. Petitioner has not made a “clear showing” of actual bias or conflict of interest by the trial judge. Likewise, the Supreme Court found that  the mere administration of an oath by a judicial officer to the declared winner of an election under protest, without more, does not give rise to any implication of bias or conflict of interest.
  4. Sammons v Economou and Dryships, Inc., SCT Civil 17-04 (11/15/17): Order Denying Petitioner for Writ of Mandamus. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge did not have a “non-discretionary” duty under the Constitution (see Cont. Art. II, Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 14(1)) or the MIRCP, Rule 1, to allow telephonic appearance, so as to support a writ of mandamus.

2018

  1. Samsung v Focus and Karamehmet (1), SCT Civil 18-02 (05/28/18): Order Denying Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal.  The Supreme Court, as a single judge subject to full panel review, denied Samsung’s request for an injunction to restrain defendant Karamehmet, pending appeal, from transferring any shares in Focus, from Focus transferring on record ownership of its shares, and from Focus transferring any of its assets, as Samsung had failed to show a reasonable probability of the court having in personam jurisdiction over Karamehmet.
  2. Samsung v Focus and Karamehmet (2), SCT Civil 18-02 (06/13/18): Order for Injunction Pending Appeal. The Supreme Court, as a single judge subject to full panel review, granted Samsung’s request for an injunction to restrain Focus, pending appeal, from transferring its assets, other than in the ordinary course of business, including shares of Genel Energy plc.  The Supreme Court found (i) that there was probable jurisdiction over Focus, (ii) that Samsung had made a showing of “irreparable harm”, (iii) that the issues raised are so substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair grounds for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation, and (iv) that the “balance of the hardships” favored Samsung.
  3. Samsung v Focus and Karamehmet (3), SCT Civil 18-02 (06/20/18): Order Vacating Preliminary Injunction.  The Supreme Court, siting as a full panel, vacated the single judge order granting Focus an injunction pending appeal.
  4. Asignacion v Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrgesellschaft MbH & Cie Kg, SCT Civil 16-03 (06/20/18): Decision on Appeal.  The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court decision that the case is barred by the statute of limitations.  “Asignacion admits that he failed to file suit within the two-year RMI statute of limitations.  His sole argument is that the statute is equitably tolled based on his prosecution of the suit in Louisiana. ‘Equitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control made it impossible to file a claim on time.’ Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).”
  5. Chubb, et al., v Eleni Maritime Ltd and Empire Bulkers Ltd. (1),SCT Civil 18-05 (07/18/18): In its Order Denying Request to Vacate and/or Modify “Order Dismissing Interlocutory Appeal,” the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s partial summary judgment order is not a “final decision” from which an appeal lies as of right. That order is interlocutory. Marshall Islands precedent has held the Supreme Court is without power to entertain an interlocutory appeal absent certification by the High Court pursuant to MIRCP Rule 54(b ). Certification was not obtained. The Supreme Court was not convinced that the historic admiralty practice of allowing an appeal of a liability determination prior to a trial on the damages issue is part of the “general maritime law.” Appellant flatly asserts, without citation of authority, that 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3) is a codification of the general maritime law of the United States which this Court is to follow under 47 MIRC 113. Appellant argues 47 MIRC 113 makes no distinction between substantive and procedural “general maritime law.” But, the very definition of”general maritime law” suggests that distinction. The “general maritime law” is a term of art which denotes federal judge made maritime law. See, e.g., Coto v. J Ray McDermott, S.A., 709 So.2d 1023, 1028 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (“The General Maritime Law … of the United States is a branch of federal common law that furnishes the rule of decision in admiralty and maritime cases in the absence of preemptive legislation.”) (citing Thomas J.Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law§ 5.1). Secondary sources indicate that the term “general maritime law” refers to “substantive” rules of maritime law. See Robert Force, Admiralty and Maritime Law,Federal Judicial Center, 2013, at pp. 22-23; William Tetley, Q.C., Glossary of Maritime Law Terms, 2nd Ed. 2004 (citing Tetley, “The General Maritime Law – The Lex Maritima” (1994) 20 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 105 -145 at pp. 121-128 and RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 960, 1999 AMC 1330, 1344 (4th Cir. 1999)).
  6. MYJAC Fdtn, Panama v Arce and Alfaro, SCT Civil 17-06 (07/30/18): In its Opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order denying two Costa Rican defendants’ motion to set aside a default judgment. The Supreme Court held that the complaint’s explicit allegations of fraud against a Polish lawyer were sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the two Costa Rican defendants had also engaged in fraudulent or deceitful behavior affecting two RMI corporations, i.e., persons, thereby bringing them within the reach of the RMI’s long-arm jurisdiction statute, 27 MIRC 251(1)(n).  The Supreme Court also held that the Costa Rican defendants failed to show that they did not understand the language of the summons and complaint, both of which were written in English, and that neither the method of service nor the use of the English language in the summons and complaint violated Costa Rican laws.
  7. Mongaya v AET MCV BETA LLC, et al. (1), SCT Civil 17-03 (10/10/18): Opinion.  The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Stay Action Pending Arbitration. Prior to working on a vessel registered in the RMI, a Filipino sailor signed a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Contract (POEA), which required the sailor, if injured, to participate in arbitration in the Philippines. The vessel owner and vessel operator were not signatories on the POEA contract. After the sailor was injured, the defendants sought to enforce the arbitration provision. At the time of the High Court decision, the RMI had acceded to but had not yet enacted the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The Supreme Court held that non-signatories can enforce a contractual arbitration provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) if there is a close relationship between the parties involved; (2) if there is a relationship between the alleged wrong and the non-signatories’ obligations and duties; and (3) if the claims are intertwined with the underlying contractual obligations. The Supreme Court also upheld that the choice of law provision in the POEA contract.
  8. Mongaya v. AET MCV BETA LLC, et al. (2), SCT Civil 17-03 (09/05/18): Order Deny Motion for Reconsideration.
  9. Chubb, et al., v Eleni Maritime Ltd and Empire Bulkers Ltd. (2), SCT Civil 18-05 (September 5, 2018): Order Denying Request to Vacate and/or Modify “Order Dismissing Interlocutory Appeal.”
  10. Samsung v Focus and Karamehmet (4), SCT Civil 18-02 (09/06/18): In an Amended Opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order dismissing Samsung’s action for enforcement of a foreign judgment.  The High Court dismissed the enforcement action as (i) it did not have personal jurisdiction over the debtor, Karamehmet, nor (ii) was his property, shares of stock in Focus, located in the Republic.  Mere ownership of shares in a Marshall Islands corporation does not constitute ownership of property in the Marshall Islands.  In this connection, the Supreme Court held the High Court did not err by incorporating Section 8-112 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the common law of the Republic.  Section 8-112, in relevant part, provides that the “interest of a debtor in a certificated security may be reached by a creditor only by actual seizure of the security certificate by the officer making the attachment or levy.”  This is, the situs of certificated shares or stock is where the certificated shares are located.

2019

  1. Hitto v. Bejang, SCT Civil 17-05 (09/05/19): In its Opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision denying the Appellants’ request for an award of post-judgment interest on their portion of money distributed from a trust account.  Section 102 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act, 30 MIRC Ch. 1, provides “[a] judgment for the payment of money shall be a lien upon the personal property of the judgment debtor and shall bea interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) a year from the date it is filed.”  In this case, the money in question was held by a third party to be paid to the appropriate landowners.  The Appellants were determined to be the appropriate landowners and, hence, received moneys held in trust.  The Appellees were not required to pay any money to the Appellants.  Accordingly, the Appellees were not “judgment debtors,” nor was the money paid to the Appellants a “money judgment” for purposes of Section 102.  For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision.
  2. Highland Floating Rate Opportunities Fund, et al.v. Dryships Inc., et al., SCT Civil 18-10 (09/09/19):  In its Opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing to sue.  The High Court had dismissed the complaint on several grounds, including lack of standing.  The High Court had granted comity to and recognized a Cayman Islands insolvency order restructuring of Ocean Rig UDW, Inc., a subsidiary of defendant Dryships.  As part of the restructuring, the plaintiffs’ claims against UDW were extinguished.  As a consequence, the plaintiffs ceased to be a UDW creditors.  As creditors of UDW, the plaintiffs could have sued Dryships and others for fraudulent conveyances from UDW to them.  However, with the extinguishing of the plaintiffs’ creditor status, the plaintiffs lost their fraudulent conveyance claims against Dryships and others.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs lost their standing to sue Dryships and others.  Additionally, the High Court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the Business Corporations Act, Section 128(5), preserved their creditor rights as UDW creditors indefinitely after UDW re-domiciled from the Marshall Islands to the Caymen Islands.  The High Court ruled that although the mere re-domiciling did not extinguish the plaintiffs’ creditor rights in UDW, corporate actions taken by UDW 18 months later under the Cayman Islands insolvency laws could, and did, extinguish their creditor rights as part of a restructuring.  The Supreme Court did not address the other grounds upon which the High Court dismissed the case, as it affirmed the High Court dismissal of the case for lack of standing.
  3. Ishiguro v. Imam Joyia & Ahamadiyya Muslim Jama’, SCT Civil 17-01 (09/10/19): In its Opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Imam Joyia and the Ahamadiyya Muslim Jama’. The main issue presented on appeal was whether the Marshallese custom of Drien Bujirok required Ishiguro’s consent, as senior dri jerbal, to a ground lease modification reducing the annual lease payment of $1,000.00 to the significantly lower amount of $1.00. The ground lease and amendment were signed by Ishiguro’s predecessor, Nena, as both alap and senior dri jerbal. Nena held the senior dri jerbal rights by virtue of a 1989 agreement between Nena and Ishiguro. The High Court found that Ishiguro failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as his being the senior dri jerbal at the time the lease and amendment were signed and that the custom of Drien Bujirok applied. That is. he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the application of the Drien Bujirok custom to the facts of this case. There being no issue of fact in regards to custom, the High Court did not err (i) in holding the parties to the “clear and unambiguous” language of the 1989 “Agreement” and subsequent 2013 “ground lease modification,” (ii) in failing to refer this case to the Traditional Rights Court, or (iii) in dismissing Ishiguro’s claims.
  4. Samuel v Chief Electoral Officer, et al., SCT Civil 18-01 (09/26/19):  In its Opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision in HCT CA 2016-121 on other grounds. Appellant Samuel was a candidate in the November 2015 election for mayor of the Majuro Atoll Local Government (“MALGOV”). However, he received fewer votes than one of his opponents, appellee Laddie Jack. Samuel petitioned appellee Chief Electoral Officer (“CEO”) for a recount. Without ruling the recount petition, the CEO certified that Jack had won the race. Under the MALGOV Constitution, Section 8(1), the term of office of mayor commences on the day after the day on which his election or appointment is certified. After the certification, Jack assumed office as the mayor of MALGOV. Samuel sued the CEO for certifying the results before his recount petition was resolved. Samuel maintained that until his recount petition was resolved, he was the holdover mayor of Majuro. Samuel argued that allowing Jack to serve as mayor on a “premature certification” would be an absurd result and that the Court should interpret Section 8(1) to avoid such a result. Although the High Court Associate Justice found that the CEO’s certification was premature, he ruled that under a superior rule of statutory construction, i.e., the “preeminent” rule, where the law is unambiguous, the court should not interpret the law, but rather apply the law as written. And, since Section 8(1) was clear and unambiguous, he would not interpret it or rewrite it as Samuel requests. Accordingly, in denying Samuel’s motion for a summary judgment and granting the CEO’s motion to dismiss, he held that although the CEO had prematurely certified the election results, Jack became the mayor of Majuro the day after the certification. The Supreme Court rejected the High Court Associate Justice’s decision in HCT CA 2016-121. The Supreme Court found that the CEO’s certification of the election prior to resolving the recount petition was invalid. However, this conclusion did not end the matter. In February 2017, the CEO, on remand from the Chief Justice of the High Court, rejected in writing Samuel’s petition for a recount. In a subsequent High Court case, HCT CA 2017-037, Samuel challenged the CEO’s rejection. In that case, the Chief Justice found that the CEO had not erred in rejecting Samuel’s petitioner for recount. After this ruling the CEO did not recertify Jack’s election. However, the Supreme Court “concluded that because Jack was unquestionably elected mayor, there is no basis whatsoever for removing Jack from that office and reinstating Samuel. As such, Samuel is left without any possible relief.” On these grounds, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision in HCT CA 2016-121 on other grounds.
  5. Bien and MJCC v Milli Atoll Local Government, et al., SCT Civil 18-06 (10/09/19):  In its Opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision. Defendants-Appellants Kejjo Bien (“Bien”) and Marshalls Japan Construction Co. (“MJCC”) (collectively, Defendants”) appeal the High Court’s denial of Defendants’ Republic of the Marshall Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment and an associated order denying a motion to strike the opposition to that Rule 60(b) Motion. The Rule 60(b) Motion, however, was filed over a year after the underlying judgment awarded $40,000 to Plaintiffs and almost a year after an order amending that judgment to add an award of $120,000 in statutory punitive damages. Defendants did not appeal either the underlying judgment or the order awarding punitive damages. All the issues Defendants raised in the Rule 60(b) Motion could have been raised on a direct appeal. Given this posture, the High Court properly denied the Rule 60(b) Motion under well-accepted waiver principles: (i) an appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review; (ii) in no circumstances may a party use a Rule 60(b) motion as a substitute for an appeal that it failed to timely file; (iii) failing to present an argument in opposition to summary judgment below, fails to preserve the argument for appeal; (iv) arguments raised for the first time on appeal are deemed waived; (v) if a party fails to raise an objection to an issue before judgment, he or she waives the right to challenge the issue on appeal (citations omitted). Further, the High Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion on the merits as to jurisdiction or in refusing to strike the opposition.
  6. Lekka v Kiluwe (as CEO), HCT CA 2019-046, and Konou and Lehman v Kiluwe (as CEO) and Kawakami (as AAG), HCT CA 2019-069, SCT Civil 2019-002(10/09/19):  In its Opinion on Removed Question from the High Court, the Supreme Court found that P.L 2016-28, which denied the right of Marshallese residing outside of the Marshall Islands the right to vote in national and local elections, was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Daniel Cadra, with whom Associate Justice Seeborg concurred and Associate Justice Seabright concurred by a separate option, concluded that a qualified Marshallese voter residing outside the Marshall Islands has the constitutional right to vote in the Marshall Islands national or local elections but does not have the right to vote by postal ballot or by some other specific method unless authorized by Act or regulation. Because P.L. 2016-028 eliminates all practical means for plaintiffs and others similarly situated to exercise their constitutionally protected right to vote without providing some reasonable alternative method of exercising that right, P.L. 2016-028 presents an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs’ right to vote and is unconstitutional.  However, the Supreme Court also found that the timing of the filing of plaintiffs’ claims in close proximity to the upcoming November 2019 elections presents an unreasonable burden on the government in attempting to comply with this decision by either making postal ballots available on short notice or by providing some alternative method of voting to that class of qualified non-resident Marshallese voters such as plaintiffs.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court made its decision prospective in application only after the November 2019 elections, and it returned the case to the High Court for such further proceedings which may be necessary to resolve this case.
  7. Iroij Kabua, et al. v M/V Mell Springwood, et al., SCT No. 2016-001, SCT Civil 2016-001(10/22/19):  In its Opinion the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision. The plaintiffs (“Kabua Plaintiffs”) filed this action in rem against the vessel, the M/V Mell Springwood (“Vessel”), and in personam against the Vessel’s owner, Tammo Shipping Company Limited, and others (“Defendants”) claiming damages resulting from the Vessel running around off shore in Kwajalein Lagoon. The High Court dismissed the in personam claim with prejudice and the in rem claim without prejudice. As to the former, the High Court found the Kabua Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for two reasons: (1) the purported delegation of authority from the Environmental Protection Authority (“EPA”) to the Kabua Plaintiffs was not proper because the EPA Act does not provide the EPA with authority to bring a lawsuit for civil damages; and (2) the Kabua Plaintiffs have not shown that they have a legal interest in the reef that was damaged by the Vessel’s grounding. Additionally, the High Court found the Kabua Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for two reasons: (1) failure to assert a property interest in the damaged reef; and (2) failure to allege a valid delegation by the EPA to pursue a derivative action on its behalf. As to the in rem claim, the High Court found the Vessel had not been arrested within the RMI’s territorial waters, and so there was no in rem jurisdiction.
  8. Konou and Lehman v Kiluwe (as CEO) and Kawakami (as AAG), HCT CA 2019-069, SCT Civil 2019-002(10/29/19):  In its Order the Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s Konou and Lehman’s “Emergency Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration.”In their motion, plaintiffs request this Court to remove its decision of “prospective application of
    the finding of unconstitutionality of P. L. 20 16-028.” Plaintiffs also seek an order directing the High Court, “on an urgent basis, to compel testimony of the Chief Electoral Officer on the Electoral Administration sprinting and ballot mailing capabilities,’ as well as directing the High Court to make certain specific orders which include the ” printing and mailing of ballots to realistically enable return by November 25, 2019″; ··acceptance of fill registered voters’ postal ballot applications”; and requiring “acceptance of all registered voters’ postal ballot applications; and if necessary, delay of the election to provide full participation by all eligible voters.” The Supreme Court reconsidered its opinion granting prospective application of our decision finding P.L. 2018-028 unconstitutional and denied plaintiffs’ requested relief. The Supreme Court found that the issue is not, as intimated by plaintiffs, whether there is sufficient time to print postal ballots. The issue is whether there is sufficient time for the government to choose among various alternatives available to it to bring the law into compliance with our decision. Further, it is not the role of the Courts to tell or dictate to the legislature what choice it must make in that regard. An attempt to do so would raise separation of powers and rule of law issues. The Court held that “given the proximity of the election, it is simply unrealistic to expect the government to engage the legislative machinery and processes necessary to implement its choice as to how to comply with our decision.”
  9. Samuel v Almen (as CEO), MOIA, RMI, and Jack, SCT Civil 2018-001(10/29/19):  Order denying appellant’s “Motion for Enlargement of Time for Filing Motion for Reconsideration.